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ECONOMIC LIBERALISATION OF EDUCATION 
PROVISION WITHIN THE EC & WTO:
A HUMAN RIGHTS PERSPECTIVE
John Morijn*
Summary: This paper addresses the impact of WTO- and EC-driven 
liberalisation of trade in services on non-trade policies. Adopting a hu-
man rights perspective, which is given as having a critical bearing on 
both “trade” and “non-trade” in “trade and …” discussions, it seeks 
particularly to map an analysis of the merits of (further) subjecting 
education provision to economic liberalisation. As concerns the WTO, 
assessment of the GATS´ wording leads to the fi nding that education 
provision seems likely to be construed as within GATS’ scope, and 
therefore fully subject to its disciplines. In that context, it is submitted 
that states’ decisions concerning offering (and seeking) commitments 
in the area of education provision need to be informed by human 
rights obligations, such as that of provision “free of charge”. In the EC 
context, distinction is made of the internal and external component of 
education-as-service discussions. Internally, the Court of Justice has 
excluded education provision from the legal discipline of the free move-
ment of services, a situation seemingly increasingly at odds with the 
far-reaching subjection of the provision of similar public goods, such 
as health care. Yet, due to education’s specifi c nature in forming indi-
viduals and societies, it is argued that there are important reasons to 
keep excluding (parts of) education provision from the EC services law 
discipline. Externally, the concern relates in particular to the possibil-
ity that developing countries will be requested by the EC to provide 
EC-based economic operators access to their education ´markets´ at a 
stage when it is not yet possible to determine whether the EC foreign 
policy objective of human rights advancement can be guaranteed. 
1. Introduction
Policies designed to further non-trade issues embodying essential 
societal values are nowadays frequently simultaneously subject to multi-
ple international and supranational trade liberalisation regimes. For the 
European Community (EC), this implies that developments infl uencing 
its trade and non-trade policy-making no longer originate solely in the 
EC legal order itself but also, for example, in the World Trade Organisa-
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tion (WTO). As a result, the predictability and legitimacy of the European 
integration process has become conditional upon the careful assessment 
of developments outside of it. Issues of balancing trade and non-trade 
policy-making today require careful multilevel analysis. 
This paper seeks to provide the beginning of a multilayered analy-
sis of but one topical trade/non-trade issue that is debated in different 
forums: the impact of trade in services liberalisation on education provi-
sion. This subject is present, fi rstly, in the current legal provisions of the 
EC Treaty. It is also dealt with in a signifi cantly different way under the 
provisions of the Constitutional Treaty (CT) now pending for ratifi cation. 
Secondly, it is on the agenda of the current Doha Development Round of 
negotiations as conducted within the WTO. Even if the legal contexts are 
different, similar questions are raised in these interconnected settings. 
Therefore, studying in parallel how EC and WTO law provisions are to be 
understood as speaking to the interface of trade liberalisation and educa-
tion policy is benefi cial for appreciating likely future policy-directions and 
their implications. 
To an EC legal specialist, the framing of the problem may appear odd 
at fi rst sight. After all, it is well known that the European Court of Justice 
(ECJ) has held in its case law that the provision of national education, 
as long as it is largely fi nanced from the public purse, is not a service 
and therefore not subject to the EC legal discipline of free movement of 
services.1 Yet, quite clearly at odds with this, the currently dormant EC 
common commercial policy provisions lay down the possibility of mak-
ing a commitment to liberalising the national education provision of the 
Member States as a “service” under the WTO’s General Agreement on 
Trade in Services (GATS).2 In addition, the CT once again changes the 
picture of the economic liberalisation/education policy nexus, and in a 
way that is not immediately transparent. On the one hand, the wording 
that only a “risk of seriously disturbing the national organisation of edu-
cation services” will justify unanimity voting3 can be taken as signifying 
a strong political determination to consider some form of future EC ac-
1 Case C-263/86 Belgian State v Humbel [1988] ECR 5365 paras 17-19; case 109/92 
Stephan Max Wirth v Landeshauptstadt Hannover [1993] ECR I-6447 paras 15-17. 
2 Art 133(6), para 2 EC: “Agreements relating to … educational services … shall fall within 
the shared competence of the Community and its Member States. [I]n addition to a Commu-
nity decision taken in accordance with ... Article 300 EC, the negotiation of such agreement 
shall require the common accord of the Member States.” 
3 Art III-315(4) para 3, under (b) CT: “The Council shall ... act unanimously for the negotia-
tion and conclusion of agreements ... in the fi eld of trade in ... education ... services, where 
these agreements risk seriously disturbing the national organisation of such services and 
prejudicing the responsibility of Member States to deliver them” (emphasis added). The 
wording implies a fall-back to qualifi ed majority voting (art III-315(4) para 1) if “seriously 
disturbing” is not established.
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tion on education services. On the other, the upgraded EU Fundamental 
Rights Charter (Charter) could come to serve as a counterbalancing force 
against overly economic (or any other form of single-minded) appreciation 
of multifaceted policy questions.4 
WTO lawyers and liberal trade economists are likely equally to ex-
press surprise as to the choice of focus of the paper. For even if educa-
tion is one of the 12 services areas in which states may opt to seek and 
offer commitments in the GATS context, commitments have so far in fact 
been few. Yet, there is no sector that is a priori excluded from the current 
round of trade negotiations. Given the mercantilist nature that such ne-
gotiations have always had, it is quite likely that requests are made with 
regard to one sector to compensate for a “sacrifi ce” in another. Sectors 
for which the implications of liberalisation have remained under-negoti-
ated, and hence under-explored, are more vulnerable to being “negotiated 
away” in last minute deals. This alone justifi es addressing the problem 
even at this stage.
The analysis is undertaken from the particular viewpoint of human 
rights law and principles. Both in the WTO and EC legal settings, human 
rights are legally relevant by virtue of their binding nature in parallel to 
the norms more primarily concerned with freeing and disciplining trade. 
This does not, however, mean that it is always immediately clear which 
human rights are likely to be strengthened or threatened in a particular 
context of economic liberalisation. It is not to be denied that the process 
of ongoing economic liberalisation also forces human rights proponents 
more clearly to articulate their concerns. In that light, the question is 
raised whether human rights norms dealing with education are suffi -
ciently clear on the international and European level to help refi ne, and 
possibly redefi ne, the economic liberalisation/education provision dis-
cussion.
  The discussion will be undertaken as follows. First, by way of back-
ground to the method of analysis, the meaning and function of a human 
rights perspective of trade liberalisation is clarifi ed (section 2). Next, the 
nexus of liberalisation of services and education policy within the WTO/
GATS setting is discussed with particular reference to the human right 
to education (section 3). In the following section, the same exercise is 
undertaken for the EC context (section 4). We will end with a brief con-
clusion (section 5).
4 See for some suggestions on the possible transformative impact of the EU Charter on legal 
rules and methodologies of economic integration, J Morijn, ‘Balancing Fundamental Rights 
and Common Market Freedoms in Union Law: Schmidberger and Omega in the Light of the 
European Constitution’ (2006) 12(1) European Law Journal 15.
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2. The meaning and function of a human rights perspective of trade 
liberalisation 
Discussions of the merits of trade liberalisation generally, and the 
implications of specifi c areas of trade liberalisation on societal values 
and human rights protection, are typically polarised. Rare is the observer 
from the trade, non-trade or human rights discipline who is not only truly 
versed in the nuts and bolts of the “others”’ law5 but also explicitly tries to 
come to an even-handed analysis. As a well-known trade lawyer recently 
wrote: “the division between trade and human rights is often exacerbated 
by the approach in the literature…both sides have perhaps displayed 
an air of advocacy”.6 Therefore, by way of background, it is necessary to 
clarify how trade liberalisation typically impacts on non-trade policies 
and what a human rights perspective could add to this debate. 
One of the reasons for the limited understanding between traders and 
proponents of any non-trade issue generally is that it is frequently not 
well articulated or explicated by either side just how their disciplines are 
perceived as coming to interrelate. It is far from straightforward. Therefore, 
it may be useful here to present a simplifi ed articulation of the aspects of 
the interplay between trade liberalisation and non-trade issues that are of 
particularly signifi cance to tracking the human rights dimension. 
The basic idea of an economic integration scheme is that States 
member to it gradually merge (chosen parts of) their national markets 
into one. The resulting freer circulation of companies, capital and prod-
ucts contributes to the discovery and survival of the most effi cient rules, 
since economic agents tend to move to where the regulatory environment 
is more favourable to their objectives.7 As a consequence, standards of 
national regulation themselves (such as education policy) will also be 
competing in the international market,8 which generates a process of reg-
ulatory competition among states.
5 C McCrudden, ‘International Economic Law and the Pursuit of Human Rights: A Frame-
work for Discussion of “Selective Purchasing” Laws under the WTO Government Procure-
ment Agreement’ (1999) 3 JIEL 47: “One of the diffi culties conducting [the] debate [of in-
ternational economic law and the pursuit of human rights] is the existence … of largely 
separate spheres that those concerned with international trade, on the one hand, and hu-
man rights, on the other, seem to inhabit. Few are experts in both, and there is often con-
siderable diffi culty in developing a common language for discussion between them”.
6 JH Jackson, ‘Refl ections on the Possible Research Agenda for Exploring the Relationship 
between Human Right Norms and International Trade Rules’, in FM Abbott et al. (eds), 
International Trade and Human Rights,Ffoundations and Conceptual Issues (University of 
Michigan Press, Ann Arbor 2005 (forthcoming)).
7 E-U Petersmann, ‘From “Negative” to “Positive” Integration in the WTO: Time For “Main-
streaming Human Rights” into WTO Law?’ (2000) 37 CMLRev 1363, 1370.
8 MP Maduro, ‘Is There Any Such Thing As Free or Fair Trade? A Constitutional Analysis of 
the Impact of International Trade on the European Social Model’ in G De Búrca and J Scott 
(eds), The EU and the WTO (Hart Publishing, Oxford 2001) 260.
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Regulatory competition, if and when it occurs,9 infl uences nation-
al policies (and therefore the individual entitlement aspects inherent in 
them) in a complex way. Although there is “no legal obligation on states 
to [adapt or] lower standards, economic competition [will] open [states’] 
regulatory systems to corresponding competition and effi ciency criteria, 
which means a de facto subjection of normative ideals to economic com-
petition”.10 With a view to remaining suffi ciently competitive in the area 
of potential comparative advantage, states may start thinking11 of meas-
ures to change their regulatory system (potentially in any fi eld of national 
policy) in order to attract trade. 
Reconsideration of national policies resulting from trade liberalisa-
tion has often been described in terms of leading to “a race to the bot-
tom”. Yet, it is important to have a clear understanding of what this 
entails. Most observers agree that no such thing occurs as a race literally 
to the bottom.12 The concern arises from the possibility that economic 
integration, and the way in which its rules are interpreted, will lead to a 
regulatory dynamic in which standards are set (and/or cherished), and 
measures taken (or postponed), strategically. That is, in order to estimate 
the relative impact of the reform measure on the competitive position, 
policy-making in any fi eld is likely to come from the primordial viewpoint 
of trade economics. 
The point to be made is that this may lead to disregard of the specifi c 
own logic and rationale of the non-trade policy-area, potentially resulting 
in solutions that are sub-optimal from the perspective of the non-trade 
policy.13 In other words, in the operation of the rules of economic integra-
tion aiming at increasing effi ciency and wealth, states’ non-trade regula-
9 It has been argued that the concept of regulatory competition only takes place in high-
ly specifi c regulatory contexts involving particular activities or products, but that it does 
not generalise well and hence may be of limited explanatory value; G Davies, ‘The Le-
gal Framework of Regulatory Competition’ (2006) <http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.
cfm?abstract_id=903138> (3) accessed 3 October 2006. This paper does not aim at engaging 
with that fi nding as such. Rather, the simplifi ed description presented here is intended to 
illustrate the most obvious dynamic by which the operation of trade law (i.e. free movement 
of goods, services, etc.) can come indirectly to infl uence the sustenance and articulation of 
individual entitlements embedded in national regulation. In other words, a discussion of 
regulatory competition in the limited fi eld of economic free movement law is introduced to 
set the stage for articulation of how human rights could be infl uenced (both positively and 
negatively) by trade liberalisation.   
10 Maduro (n 8) 263. Emphasis added.  
11 This is not to say that it will always happen. As has been pointed out, “changing regu-
lation may stimulate economic activity in one state without having a direct or correlative 
negative effect on activity in others… the model [of a process of competition between states] 
should not be understood in quite such a discrete way”; Cf. Davies (n 9) 5. 
12 AT Guzman, ‘Trade, Labor, Legitimacy’ (2003) 885 California Law Review fn 28.
13 DC Esty, ‘Bridging the Trade-Environment Divide’ (2001) 15(3) Journal of Economic Per-
spectives 113, 124. 
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tory powers are conditioned, potentially resulting in perversely affecting 
the running of (or honouring the international obligations inherent in) 
those policy areas. As a result, many issues, at fi rst sight unrelated to 
free trade rules, may sometimes end up being subject to their disciplines, 
and their interpreters’ logic.
This brings us to the question of the meaning and function of hu-
man rights law in this context of the impact of economic integration on 
non-trade policy-making. There is a need for an explicit treatise given the 
degree of suspicion about the reasons for voicing human rights concerns 
in a trade context.14 Even if the following is mainly focused on the WTO 
setting, it should be seen as directly relevant to the EC setting by virtue 
of the EC’s WTO membership, and the resulting legal relevance of WTO 
law in the EC legal order. 
A helpful starting-point is a number of policy papers produced by the 
Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) dealing with 
the impact of specifi c WTO trade rules on human rights. These reports15 
articulate an approach to trade liberalisation that is explicitly based in 
human rights law and defi ne a legal methodology to assess the relation-
ship between trade and human rights. It is stated that the human rights 
approach to trade “sets as entitlements the basic needs necessary to lead 
a life in dignity and ensures their protection in the processes of economic 
liberalisation”.16 These entitlements cannot be “reduced to mere privi-
leges or luxuries or left subject to the whims of the market”.17 Therefore, 
the notion that human rights are the universally applicable entitlements 
of every human being is the basis of their application to trade law. 
The legitimacy of invoking human rights obligations is explained 
with reference to the fact that all WTO members have undertaken ob-
14 As a recent fascinating paper has sharply put it: “[B]oth supporters and opponents of free 
trade are using human rights in their arguments for or against the liberalisation of trade ... 
yet the overuse of human rights language threatens to devalue the concept of human rights, 
reducing it to a catch-phrase employed by both sides of the discussion to convince the chal-
lenger of the legitimacy of their claims... this not only seems to blur the picture rather than 
clear it up, it also has negative effects on the concept of human rights”; Floris Van Hees, 
‘Protection v. Protectionism - The Use of Human Rights Arguments in the Debate for and 
against the Liberalisation of Trade’ (2004) master thesis defended in the European Master’s 
Programme in Human Rights and Democratisation <http://www.kenan-fl agler.unc.edu/
assets/documents/hrtProtectionVersusProtectionism.pdf> (38) accessed 3 October 2006.
15 See in particular the Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘The Impact of 
the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on human rights’ 
(2001) E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (TRIPS Report); Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Hu-
man Rights, ‘Globalisation and its impact on the full enjoyment of human rights’ (2002) 
E/CN.4/2002/54 (AoA Report) (focusing specifi cally on the Agreement on Agriculture); and 
Offi ce of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, ‘Liberalisation of trade in services and 
human rights’ (2002) E/CN.4/Sub.2/2002/9 (GATS Report). 
16 GATS Report para 6.
17 GATS Report para 6; AoA Report para 9.
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ligations under human rights treaties and that in any context “human 
rights are the fi rst responsibility of Governments”.18 Of signifi cance for 
the discussion to follow is that only two current WTO Members have 
not ratifi ed the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights19 and only one has not ratifi ed the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child.20 Therefore, the overwhelming majority of WTO member states 
hold concurrent responsibilities to promote and protect social and eco-
nomic rights, such as the right to education, as well as to implement 
trade rules.21 The reports argue that WTO members have human rights 
obligations at all stages of the process of trade liberalisation - when ne-
gotiating new agreements or revising existing ones, when implementing 
the rules that have already been negotiated, and also in monitoring the 
effects of the agreement they have entered into.22 In short, WTO Mem-
bers are legally bound to promote and protect human rights when acting 
within the ambit of trade law.23
The focus of the OHCHR human rights approach to trade is on proc-
esses and outcomes - on how trade liberalisation efforts affect the enjoy-
ment of human rights in actual fact. The fundamental argumentation is 
that even if the overall result of the liberalisation of a specifi c form of trade 
is wealth creation and welfare enhancement, and even if the increased 
resources trickle down to some extent to those most marginalised in each 
society, there will still be losers during and as a result of the process. To 
deal with that reality, a human rights approach provides a methodology 
for assessing when the “losers” from the process of trade liberalisation 
are bound to lose, or are unjustifi ably prevented from benefi ting, and 
when action is required. 
Even if these reports provide a valuable starting-point, it is argued 
here that they naturally lead to a number of further fi ndings that may 
18 TRIPS Report para 13; AoA Report para 10.
19 The United States and South Africa, the latter country’s situation being signifi cantly miti-
gated from a human rights perspective by the presence of the world’s most judicially activist 
Constitutional Court in the fi eld of social human rights.
20 The United States of America.
21 AoA Report para 8.
22 AoA Report para 8; GATS Report para 7.
23 This paper does not discuss the problem of how human rights law can come to be brought 
up, and approached, as relevant, in WTO dispute settlement as a matter of WTO law. This 
in itself is far from an uncontroversial matter. It is presupposed here that, as a matter of 
legal coherence, human rights law must be relevant to WTO dispute settlement, particularly 
when brought up by States in defence of the human rights of their own population. The 
simple reason is that states cannot be presumed to have laid off their human rights obliga-
tions when entering an economic integration scheme. It is only a matter of time before a 
state phrases legal arguments in terms of human rights in a WTO dispute. For an analysis 
of the methodological issues arising from a state invoking human rights to make a challenge 
in the EC law context, see Morijn (n 4). 
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benefi t from clearer explication if the aim is to make human rights analy-
sis relevant and operational, for example in the fi eld of the economic lib-
eralisation of education provision. 
Raising human rights concerns in a trade context is typically dealt 
with as yet another non-trade challenge to trade liberalisation. Indeed, 
even if their own analysis logically leads elsewhere, OHCHR reports do 
not clearly attempt to explicate the contrary. It is here argued, however, 
that presenting human rights protection as a non-trade issue is substan-
tively and functionally erroneous. I will deal with these aspects in turn.
Firstly, taking into account that international human rights law 
views the totality of economic, social, cultural, civil and political human 
rights as based on a unifi ed legal rationale (without, however, denying 
the possibility of tension between different human rights), addressing 
human rights in a trade context cannot be seen as a non-trade concern 
like environmental protection or the safeguarding of cultural diversity. A 
human rights and non-trade policy may often coincide in pushing back 
the reverse effects of trade liberalisation, but this is not necessarily so. 
Human rights protection’s bottom-up concern with the position of indi-
viduals makes it at heart qualitatively different from trade and non-trade 
policies’ top-down preoccupation with limited sectoral societal concerns. 
Human rights law takes as its primary focus individuals as legal sub-
jects, rather than itself constituting a policy objective.24 
Secondly, seeing human rights protection as a non-trade topic is 
also functionally problematic. It tends solely to stress that states still 
have the possibility to regulate in a trade context, rather than that states 
are in fact required to act as a matter of human rights law both in trade 
and non-trade contexts. This point is of particular signifi cance for the 
coming analysis. In the GATS context, the treatise of trade liberalisation’s 
impact on non-trade policies often focuses on the question of the extent 
to which states maintain a measure of regulatory autonomy/policy space 
to pursue whatever other objectives they may want to pursue. It is then 
typically argued by trade analysts that GATS fl exibility leaves states suf-
fi cient space to do as it pleases nationally. 
24 An article by the former Special Rapporteur on the Right to Education that critically ad-
dresses the intentions of some leading human rights NGOs that have recently broadened 
their professional focus to include economic, social and cultural rights (such as Human 
Rights Watch) implicitly holds this line of reasoning, K Tomasevski, ‘Unasked Questions 
about Economic, Social and Cultural Rights from the Experience of the Special Rapporteur 
on the Right to Education (1998-2004): A Response to Kenneth Roth, Leonard S. Ruben-
stein, and Mary Robinson’ (2005) 27 Human Rights Quarterly 709: “economic, social and 
cultural rights are not about poverty but policy” (713) and “those who claim to be doing 
human rights work should be distinguishable from their colleagues who work in education” 
(712).
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However, from the broader viewpoint of international law, one often 
cannot escape the impression that it is not appreciated that regulatory 
autonomy is not only circumscribed by WTO law, but in fact by many 
international obligations simultaneously, including human rights law. 
However diffi cult this may be, WTO (and EC) law scholars and interpret-
ers cannot side step, or wish away, this reality.25 As a result, presenting 
trade agreements as very fl exible (and therefore - it is clearly implied - 
hardly capable of creating problems) can underplay the tension between 
the simultaneous international obligations fl owing from WTO agreements, 
treaties dealing with non-trade matters and international human rights 
treaties which are all part of the system of international law.26 
This is of course not a neutral observation, nor does it lead to easy 
or less contentious analysis. As Professor Jackson has written, “perhaps 
the most diffi cult aspect of the dialogue between trade and human rights 
is the task of looking at the future policy implications and issues ... in 
other words, what is the logic of the two subjects, and where does their 
combination lead?”27 It is obvious that different policy and legal angles 
are sometimes at odds, and interpretational choices will need to be made. 
For, as has been correctly observed, “tensions between trade and non-
trade objectives and their possible solution lie at the heart of the emerg-
ing system of global economic governance”.28 
It is submitted in the context of the coming analysis that the purpose 
and effect of a human rights analysis is simultaneously to scrutinise and 
(re)direct trade and education policy in an attempt to give expression to 
the most fundamental of individuals’ entitlements, and make the weight 
of this consideration felt in the eventual act of the balancing of different 
policy options. In other words, it is in the legal nature of human rights 
law that it simultaneously conditions (and, depending on the situation, 
25 For an interesting attempt in the WTO context, see S Cho, ‘The WTO’s Identity Crisis - Re-
view of Confl ict of Norms in Public International Law: How WTO Law Relates to Other Rules 
of International Law, By Joost Pauwelyn, 2003’ (2006) Global Law Books <http://www.
globallawbooks.org/reviews/detail.asp?id=53> (10) accessed 3 October 2006: “[C]ross-fer-
tilization or reconciliation [of non-WTO norms and WTO norms] should be the WTO’s call ... 
no other treaties should replace the WTO in that call ... after all, it is all about ‘trade and (...) 
human rights,’ not ‘(...) human rights and trade’”. (emphasis in the original).
26 For example, Krajewski presents his claim that GATS should give priority to the regula-
tory autonomy of WTO Members as in line both with WTO case law allowing for deference 
to national regulatory choices and at the same time coinciding with the OHCHR approach 
which stresses that GATS is to be interpreted as far as possible so as not to constrain gov-
ernmental action with regard to basic service provision; M Krajewski, ‘Public Services and 
Trade Liberalization: Mapping the Legal Framework’ (2003) 6(2) JIEL 341, 346-347. It is 
argued here that a human rights focus and a non-trade agenda need not always coincide.
27 Jackson (n 6). 
28 M Krajewski, ‘Balancing trade and non-trade policy objectives in GATS: Potentials and 
limits of Article XIV’ (2005) BIICL Conference on “the tenth Anniversary of the WTO Dispute 
Settlement: An Appraisal” 1.
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consequently limits or bolsters) traders’ and non-traders’ functional le-
gal claims. To make this less abstract, in the context of the European 
liberalisation of education provision it has been correctly observed that 
there is a “choice [to be made] between societal gains from the provision 
of higher education as public good and societal gains from increased 
trade in education services … [and] that there is a trade-off between the 
two approaches”.29 It is suggested here that analysis based on human 
rights law can help provide a legally relevant formulation of the minimum 
framework for this type of choice. 
Having dealt with some aspects of the meaning a human rights ap-
proach to trade and non-trade could have, a few remarks on its function 
need to be made. An issue that immediately emerges is that liberalisation 
of education services is not yet very far developed in the EC and WTO 
context. As a result, it is not easy to say to what extent tensions from 
the potential inclusion of education provision in the scope of, and their 
interpretation within, these regimes may lead to practical effects that are 
better avoided. Therefore, the question can be raised as to the reason for 
analysing this from the point of view of human rights protection already 
at this point in time (at the risk of providing a seemingly speculative 
analysis) rather than exclusively at the stage of the settlement of legal 
disputes. The answer to this has different aspects. 
Firstly, in cases where it is not yet known whether a proposed trade 
or non-trade policy is likely to promote or undermine human rights, it 
has been confi rmed in the particular context of trade liberalisation by UN 
treaty monitoring bodies that human rights law requires that a prior as-
sessment be carried out.30 In line with this, many human rights advocates 
have come to see that it may be more effective to think ahead in a con-
structive way rather than only to engage in ex post criticism of negotiation 
results. This is not a matter of “if you can’t beat them, join them”. Rather, 
it is one of “prevention is better than cure”.31 To give body to this line of 
thinking, much work is currently being done to develop a so-called human 
rights impact assessment. It is an analytical tool, used both ex ante and 
29 K Barkholt, ‘The Bologna Process and Integration Theory: Convergence and Autonomy’ 
(2005) 30(1) Higher Education in Europe 23, 24.
30 3D Trade - Human Rights - Equitable Economy and Forum-Asia, ‘Practical Guide to 
the WTO For Human Rights Advocates’ (2004) <http://www.3dthree.org/en/complement.
php?IDcomplement=36&IDcat=4&IDpage=14> (71-72) accessed 3 October 2006, referring 
to the Committee on the Rights of the Child.
31 Cf. K Tomasevski, ‘Globalizing What: Education as a Human Right or as a Traded Ser-
vice?’ (2005) 12 Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies 78; ”Refocusing human rights 
research from retroactively remedying violations to preventing them is as urgent as it is 
neglected … the full mobilization of the existing human rights standards for education can 
neutralize the negative dimension of globalization at all levels, thus enabling the human 
rights community to provide a timely contribution to developments, which were, until re-
cently, deemed to lie beyond the reach of human rights safeguards”.
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ex post, to evaluate the effects of a policy on specifi c human rights.32 More 
institutionally, given that trade negotiations are usually the sole compe-
tence of trade offi cials at the domestic level, a fi nal general reason for ex 
ante analysis is that it may help empower offi cials of other departments to 
have their interests heard in the domestic trade departments at a time still 
relevant to the formulation of positions in trade negotiations.33 
Secondly, this proactive human rights approach seems to be par-
ticularly valid for the GATS context. There is no sector, including educa-
tion, that is a priori excluded from the current round of negotiations,34 a 
legal setting known as the “built-in agenda” in trade-speak. This under-
standing to the effect of liberalising trade in services through successive 
rounds of negotiations “accentuates the need for … analysts to be alert 
to the GATS’ possible consequences for national freedoms to plan and 
operate collective, redistributive, citizen-based [public services]”.35 More-
over, given the mercantilist nature of international trade negotiations, it 
is quite likely that requests are made with regard to one sector to com-
pensate for a “sacrifi ce” in another. Sectors for which the implications of 
liberalisation have remained under-negotiated and hence under-explored 
are more vulnerable to be “negotiated away” as a result,36 particularly in 
the proverbial last-minute deals.
32 International Federation for Human Rights, ‘Understanding Global Trade & Human 
Rights - Report & Resource Guide for National Human Right NGOs in View of the 2005 WTO 
Ministerial Conference, Hong Kong’ (2005) <http://www.fi dh.org/IMG/pdf/wto423a.pdf> 
(11) accessed 3 October 2006. See also K De Feyter, Human Rights: Social Justice in The Age 
of the Market (Zed Books, London 2005) 216: “Human rights proponents need proactively 
to identify the human rights impact of economic globalisation, if human rights are to fulfi l 
their potential as instruments of social protection ... they need to do so at an early stage, 
when economic norms and mechanisms are being negotiated … human rights concerns 
must be part and parcel of the regulation of economic globalisation.”
33 P Rose, R Carr-Hill, K Holmes and T Henderson, Education and the General Agreement 
On Trade In Services: What does the Future Hold? (The Commonwealth Secretariat, London 
2003) 5.
34 JA Van Duzer, ‘Navigating Between the Poles: Unpacking the Debate on the Implications 
for Development of GATS Obligations Relating to Health and Education Services’, in EU Pe-
tersmann and J Harrison (eds), Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Effi ciency 
and Democratic Governance (Oxford University Press, Oxford 2005 (forthcoming)).
35 N Yeates, ‘The General Agreement on Trade in Services: What’s in it for Social Security?’ 
(2005) 58(1) International Social Security Review 3, 4.
36 Cf. S Bjarnason, ‘Debate on Education and GATS: Where Do We Stand?’ in P. Rose et 
al. (eds), Education and the General Agreement On Trade In Services: What does the Future 
Hold? (The Commonwealth Secretariat, London 2003) 16: “The fact that the education sec-
tor is one of the least actively negotiated should not give way to a sense of complacency 
as the negotiators have potentially much larger services on the table from a national per-
spective. It is possible that if the negotiators (usually departments of trade) are not lobbied 
persistently by education representatives to enable them to clearly understand the issues 
from the education sector, then the temptation might well be to make concessions in the 
education sector in order to gain a stronger position in what might be perceived to be some 
larger public issue.”
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A fi nal policy related point necessitating a priori human rights analy-
sis is related to the nature of the likely impact that the GATS regime has 
on the supply of public services. As Krajewski has convincingly argued, 
the obligations to grant market access and national treatment are most 
important for public services, whereas the obligation to grant Most Fa-
voured Nation Treatment is less relevant due to the fact that the public 
service or the service supplier will usually be a national service (sup-
plier) and not a foreign service (supplier).37 As will be shown in the next 
section, the national treatment and market access obligation only arise 
once a commitment is made. In other words, the structure of GATS with 
regard to public services is such that it is important to assess beforehand 
whether subjection to market access and national treatment can be re-
sponsibly done from the perspective of human rights protection. 
To sum up the meaning and function of the human rights approach 
to trade/non-trade, the starting point is that human rights law is, in prin-
ciple, neutral to both trade and the pursuit of non-trade policies. It can 
fi nd in each an ally at times and an opponent at others. The fundamental 
insight therefore is that it is in the intended legal nature of human rights 
that they condition trade and non-trade alike. As a result, and perhaps 
confusingly, when trade law collides with non-trade law, human rights 
law conditions both legal disciplines simultaneously in this clash. This 
double-edged nature of human rights law in trade/non-trade discussions 
is precisely the reason why a human rights perspective can be helpful 
in analysing a legal problem such as service liberalisation vs. education 
policy. As will be argued below, these negotiations require urgent atten-
tion from a human rights perspective for a variety of reasons. It is to such 
analysis that we will turn in the next two sections of this paper, focusing 
on the WTO (section 3) and EC contexts (section 4) in turn. 
3. Economic liberalisation of education provision in the WTO context
The provision of education is one of the public services involving 
most fi nancial resources. Annual global public spending on education 
exceeds one trillion dollars.38 UNESCO research has shown that within 
OECD countries as much as 98% of education spending is public, and 
that the average is 88%.39 While cross-border education has always been 
an important aspect of the internationalisation of higher education, it has 
not been subject to international trade rules and, until recently, has not 
37 Krajewski (n 26) 359.
38 AM Steketee, ‘For-Profi t Education Service Providers in Primary and Secondary School-
ing: The Drive For and Consequences of Global Expansion’ (2004) 11 (Summer) Indiana 
Journal of Global Legal Studies 171, 176.
39 Van Duzer (n 34). 
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really been described as an activity subject to the discipline of commer-
cial trade.40 This section starts with a brief description of the GATS rules. 
It then goes on to describe the nature and state of the global economic 
liberalisation/education provision debate. After this, a human rights per-
spective is introduced in an attempt to start appreciating how claims of 
free traders and education experts could be critically viewed from the 
standpoint of the basic entitlements of individuals.
3.1 The GATS legal framework with particular reference to 
education provision
It is important to paint an objective picture of the legal framework 
governing the global liberalisation of services. GATS is a particularly com-
plex treaty and its working is often mischaracterised.41 
Article I of GATS defi nes the scope of the Agreement and the nature 
of services trade. GATS covers 161 service activities across 12 classifi ed 
sectors, of which Education is one. The sector of education is subdivided 
into primary education services, secondary education services, higher 
education services, adult education, and other education services. GATS 
contains no defi nition of education services, nor has a reference paper 
been drawn up with regard to them (as was done, for example, with tel-
ecommunications).42 GATS excludes services which are supplied in the 
“exercise of governmental authority”, the latter being defi ned as services 
which are supplied neither on a “commercial basis nor in competition 
with one or more service suppliers” (Article I:3). 
GATS defi nes services trade as occurring through four modes of sup-
ply. In the case of education services, these are:
Mode 1: cross-border supply of educational services (on-line learning, 
distance education, videoconferencing, etc.)
Mode 2: Consumption abroad (international student mobility)
Mode 3: Foreign investment by educational institutions
Mode 4: Movement of natural persons (international teacher mobility)43
As far as relevant here, GATS operates a distinction between differ-
ent obligations. On the one hand, there are general rules and principles 
governing trade in services, most importantly the disciplines on transpar-
40 J Knight, ‘GATS, Trade and Higher Education: Perspectives 2003 - Where are We?’ (2003) 
The Observatory on Borderless Higher Education 2.
41 Cf. R Adlung, ‘Public Services and the GATS’ (2006) 9(2) JIEL 455, 456; “[M]any state-
ments [about GATS] appear to be infl uenced by personal prejudice or aversion, rather than 
by thorough analysis or factual evidence.” 
42 Van Duzer (n 34). 
43 K Larsen and S Vincent-Lancrin, ‘International Trade in Educational Services: Good or 
Bad’ (2002) 14(3) Higher Education Management and Policy 9, 11.
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ency (Article III) and most favoured nation treatment (Article II). On the 
other hand, GATS consists of schedules of commitments which outline 
the liberalisation of each Member. Sectoral schedule commitments con-
cern market access and national treatment within designated sectors. 
Such commitments identify the services (by mode of supply) for which 
the Member guarantees market access and national treatment and any 
limitations that may be attached. Members can also make market access 
and national treatment commitments across sectors (again for each mode 
of supply) in what are known as horizontal schedules of commitments. 
Within the sectoral schedules, an entry of “none” indicates that a Member 
is bound to not having or introducing any measures which violate mar-
ket access or national treatment for a specifi c sector and mode of supply 
(but any limitations set out in the horizontal schedule may still apply). 
The term “unbound” indicates that no commitment has been made for a 
particular mode of supply.
Even if it is not obligatory to respond to demands to open the mar-
ket of services, WTO Members that wish to continue to protect a certain 
services sector will de facto have to provide compensating concessions in 
other sectors in a negotiating round as a result of the WTO’s negotiation 
mantra that no a priori exclusions are allowed.44 As has been pointed out 
by Yeates, this means that GATS potentially covers services of immediate 
and direct relevance to human welfare - water, energy, health and social 
care, and education, as well as income support services.45 The implica-
tion is that the dynamic is one in which it needs to be justifi ed by a state 
why it does not wish to submit a certain policy area to GATS negotiations, 
and that protection/exclusion of one area will need to be “paid for” with 
the inclusion of another.
On the other hand, GATS expressly contemplates that a Member 
may withdraw trade concessions made in its national schedule in rela-
tion to any service sector. However, the Member State wishing to re-ne-
gotiate commitments made must wait three years after having listed a 
commitment before altering it.46 Where another Member feels the with-
drawal may affect the benefi ts it receives under GATS, it may request that 
the withdrawing state enter into negotiations with a view to agreeing on 
a compensating adjustment typically in the form of other trade conces-
sions.47
44 Guidelines and procedures for the negotiations on trade in services, adopted by the Spe-
cial Session of the Council for Trade in Services on 28 March 2001, para II.5, S/L/93, 
(quoted in Krajewski (n 26) fn 348). 
45 Yeates (n 35) 7.
46 Ibid 8. 
47 Van Duzer (n 34). See also C Scherrer, ‘GATS: long-term strategy for the commodifi cation 
of education’ (2005) 12(3) Review of International Political Economy 484, 487.
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3.2 Nature and state of the GATS economic liberalisation/education 
provision discussion
As was pointed out earlier, up until recently education provision 
seems not often to have been appreciated in terms of being subject to in-
ternational trade rules. In fact, before the start of the Doha Development 
Round in 2001, the value of trade in education services was underesti-
mated. Since then, a more precise picture has emerged of the sector’s 
relative growth in terms of exports and imports, thereby putting educa-
tion services higher up on the negotiation agenda.48
Education services are traded predominantly through student mo-
bility across borders, with students attending public universities in the 
exporting countries (mode 2: consumption abroad).49 This has become 
big business for some countries. The international market for student 
mobility amounted to $30 billion in exports in 1998, or 3% of global 
services export.50 In 2004 alone, more than 500.000 foreign students 
contributed about $13 billion to the United States economy.51 For Aus-
tralia, education services represent a value of more than 10% of its total 
exports.52 Also, commercial presence (mode 3) is growing in importance. 
Here, however, it is to be kept particularly in mind that providers other 
than traditional universities are emerging, or playing a greater role, in-
cluding vocational training institutions, private for-profi t institutions and 
distance-learning institutions.53
Discussions about the advantages and disadvantages of bringing 
education within the realm of the WTO have been polarised. Support and 
opposition towards the economic liberalisation of education provision 
manifests itself generally across professional boundaries, international 
organisations, as well as between developed and developing countries.54 
Very roughly speaking, on the one hand there are those who are anti-
trade and who believe that education is a public good and should under 
no circumstance come to be treated as a commodity. On the other hand, 
there are those who are in favour of trade, who argue that education has 
48 R Saner and S Fasel, ‘Negotiating Trade in Educational Services with the WTO/GATS 
Context’ (2003) 59 Aussenwirtschaft 275. 
49 WTO, Education Services - Background Note by the Secretariat’ (23 September 1998) S/
C/W/49 6.
50 Larsen and Vincent-Lancrin (n 43) 16.
51 C Lorenz, ‘Will the universities survive the European integration? Higher education poli-
cies in the EU and in the Netherlands before and after the Bologna Declaration’, hand-out, 
lecture at the University of Michigan, October 2005, fn 12. 
52 Saner and Fasel (n 48) 281.
53 Larsen and Vincent-Lancrin (n 43) 21.
54 Saner and Fasel (n 48) 299.
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been traded for decades, and cannot see the harm in formalising what is 
happening in any case.55 
Economic liberalisation proponents maintain that greater liberalisa-
tion of the education sector will produce effi ciency gains and stimulate 
innovative practices through market competition. It is argued that GATS 
will result in increased choice, opportunities for knowledge and tech-
nology transfer, and reduced prices.56 Moreover, the fact that countries 
are free to place as many limitations and conditions in their schedules 
of commitments as they like has led GATS supporters to posit that the 
agreement allows governments very high levels of fl exibility with respect 
to the obligations they are willing to assume.57 Also, the more general ex-
pectation that binding multilateral commitments will provide additional 
benefi t for a state in instilling confi dence in their policies and signalling 
stability in their policy intentions has been mentioned in favour of liber-
alisation.58 And even if the application of trade rules leads to problems, 
these would not necessarily need to be addressed by the WTO itself, as 
“the WTO is already overloaded; many issues, at least initially, should 
simply be addressed in other fora”.59
Those advocating against the economic liberalisation of education 
provision fear that agreeing to the liberalisation of the education sector 
would open the backdoor to the dismantling of education as a public 
service via privatisation and deregulation.60 Liberalisation commitments 
are seen as contributing to the development of a two-tier market in edu-
cation, under which public services will be undermined and those mar-
ginalised will see a diminution of badly needed education so that those 
already better off and better served will benefi t.61 Critics are also worried 
about the prospect of national education providers having to compete 
with transnational providers, which they expect may impact on the integ-
rity and future development of national education.62
As has been well observed, it is both surprising and worrisome that 
very little has been written by educators or trade specialists on the ra-
55 Rose c.s.(n 33) 5.
56 Ibid 4. 
57 L Mehta and B La Cour Madsen, ‘Is the WTO after your Water? The General Agreement 
on Trade in Services and Poor People’s Right to Water’ (2005) Natural Resources Forum 
154, 158.
58 R Chanda, ‘Social Services and the GATS: Key Issues and Concerns’ (2003) 31 World 
Development 1997, 2009.
59 DB Honeck, ‘Services 2000: Education and Training’ (2000) 25(3) Higher Education in 
Europe 291, 293.
60 Saner and Fasel (n 48) 293.
61 Van Duzer (n 34). 
62 Rose c.s. (n 33) 4.
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tionales for and the benefi ts from the import and export of education 
services. It appears that rationales are either taken for granted in the 
overall assumption that liberalised trade will increase a nation’s econom-
ic prosperity, or are found irrelevant from the preconceived viewpoint 
that the provision of education should never be traded.63 Still for the pur-
pose of engaging in even-handed assessment, it seems valuable to view 
which different rationales exist. 
A whole variety of rationales have been identifi ed for engagement 
in the liberalisation of education services. Reasons for importing high-
er education services include increased capacity, access to specialised 
knowledge and skills, development of human resource capacity, increas-
ing of competition among local higher education institutions, minimising 
the “brain drain”, and improving quality through foreign providers.64 Ex-
porting education services, on the other hand, is not often a governmen-
tal initiative, but more frequently one of particular institutions, such as 
universities. Rationales for exporting education services include easing 
excess national capacity, income generation, building up of strategic edu-
cation alliances, and the internationalisation of domestic institutions.65
Whatever one’s position, it is clear that from a legal viewpoint the 
key question about the GATS/public service overlap lies in the extent to 
which education provision is covered by GATS. For this we need to turn 
to Article I:3 (b) and (c) GATS, which read as follows:
For the purposes of this agreement 
(b) “services” includes any service in any sector except services sup-
plied in the exercise of governmental authority
(c) “a service in the exercise of governmental authority” means any 
service which is supplied neither on a commercial basis, nor in com-
petition with one or more service suppliers.66
63 Knight (n 40) 9.
64 Bjarnason (n 36) 14.
65 Ibid 15.
66 The text of the clause in the two other offi cial languages of the WTO (French and Spanish) 
reads as follows:
(b) les “services” comprennent tous les services de tous les secteurs à l’exception des servi-
ces fournis dans l’exercice du pouvoir gouvernemental;
(c) un “service fourni dans l’exercice du pouvoir gouvernemental” s’entend de tout service 
qui n’est fourni ni sur une base commerciale, ni en concurrence avec un ou plusieurs four-
nisseurs de services.
(b) el término “servicios” comprende todo servicio de cualquier sector, excepto los servicios 
suministrados en ejercicio de facultades gubernamentales;
(c) un «servicio suministrado en ejercicio de facultades gubernamentales» signifi ca todo 
servicio que no se suministre en condiciones comerciales ni en competencia con uno o va-
rios proveedores de servicios.
116 John Morijn: Economic Liberalisation of Education Provision within the EC & WTO: A Human...
In 1998 the WTO Secretariat itself stated that “basic education [i.e. 
primary and secondary education] provided by the government may be 
considered to fall within the domain of … services supplied in the exercise 
of governmental authority (supplied neither on a commercial basis nor in 
competition)”.67 In June 2002 this was reiterated by the WTO Director-
General and the Chairman of the WTO Council for Trade in Services, who 
stated that education services were included under the heading of public 
services according to the tacit understanding of the defi nition used by 
negotiators.68 However, as it was put by Larsen en Vincent-Lancrin, even 
if “this was a strong signal …it did not rule out a change of interpretation 
in the future”,69 particularly as the phrasing represents a compromise 
that has been described in terms of being an example of ´constructive 
ambiguity´.70 
Some WTO case law may suggest what the Article I:3(b)/(c) GATS 
wording of “exercise of governmental authority” could be taken to mean. 
Leroux has found that the Appellate Body could be understood as linking 
this wording to “the exercise of a power to regulate, control or supervise 
individuals or entities, or otherwise restrain their conduct, through the 
exercise of lawful authority”.71 It is then inferred that on these terms the 
exercise of governmental authority “has little to do with commerce, trade, 
and ‘mere matters of business’ … that is, the pursuit of activities mainly, 
if not exclusively, for fi nancial gain.”72 
By way of supplementary means of interpretation of Article I:3(b) 
GATS, it is worthwhile pointing out in the context of this paper that the 
EC has repeatedly stated that in its opinion the meaning of this phrase is 
similar to that of Article 45 EC (applicable to freedom to provide services 
through Article 55 EC).73 This relevant phrase reads: the provisions of this 
chapter shall not apply, so far as any given Member State is concerned, to 
activities which in that State are connected, even occasionally, with the 
67 WTO, Education Services - Background Note by the Secretariat (23 September 1998) S/C/
W/49 3-4. This implies that that it sees higher education as different, and fully subject to 
the discipline of GATS. It will be explained in the following subsection how this is relevant.
68 See also Tomasevski (n 31) 14; “GATS allows exempting services provided ‘in the exercise 
of public authority’, which comprises public compulsory education in the domestic legisla-
tion of most countries” (footnotes omitted).
69 Larsen and Vincent-Lancrin (n 43) 27.
70 EH Leroux, ‘What is a “Service Supplied in the Exercise of Governmental Authority” 
under Article I:3(b) and (c) of the General Agreement on Trade in Services?’ (2006) 40(3) 
Journal of World Trade 345, 345.
71 Ibid 352 (referring to Canada-Dairy (13 October 1999) WT/DS103/AB/R).
72 Ibid.
73 Leroux (n 71) 359.
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exercise of offi cial authority.74 On the basis of the fact that the English 
GATS text speaks of “governmental” and the EC text of “offi cial” author-
ity, it has been argued that the texts are legally different, and therefore 
that Article 45 EC “is unlikely to have any signifi cant impact on the inter-
pretation of Article I:3(b) and (c)”.75 This point is not, however, convincing 
as it hinges on but one of the relevant language versions. Parallel con-
sideration of other offi cial languages of Article I:3 GATS in comparison 
with the versions of Article 45 EC shows that various different, but very 
similar, wordings are used.76 Therefore, Article 45 EC, and EC services 
case law, should be seen as making for relevant supplementary means of 
interpretation of what constitutes “exercise of governmental authority” as 
a matter of WTO law.77
Be that as it may, the interpretational problem remains that Article 
I:3(c) GATS defi nes governmental authority in connection with the eco-
nomic context of the supply and not on the basis of the public interest 
nature of an activity. As a result, it is not possible to claim that certain 
services are a priori and permanently excluded from the scope of GATS 
because of their nature as public or governmental services. After all, eco-
nomic circumstances change over time,78 and the state invoking the ex-
emption is likely to have to bear the burden of providing evidence, which 
may be hard. In the face of these linguistic ambiguities in Articles I:3(b)/
(c) GATS, it cannot be a priori excluded that the provision of education 
74 The text of the clause in French and Spanish reads as follows:
Sont exceptées de l’application des dispositions du présent chapitre, en ce qui concerne 
l’État membre intéressé, les activités participant dans cet État, même à titre occasionnel, à 
l’exercice de l’autorité publique.
Las disposiciones del presente capítulo no se aplicarán, en lo que respecta al Estado miem-
bro interesado, a las actividades que, en dicho Estado, estén relacionadas, aunque sólo sea 
de manera ocasional, con el ejercicio del poder público.
75 Leroux (n 71) 359.
76 See nn 66 and 74 (pouvoir gouvernemental v. autorité publique and facultades guberne-
mentales v. poder público).
77 It should be added here that there is an aspect to the comparison of WTO and EC le-
gal texts regulating services that may in fact lead to diverging meanings relevant for the 
purpose of assessing the defi nition of public services. It is the wording of “provision for 
remuneration” in article 49 EC on the one hand and that of “on a commercial basis” in 
article I:3(c) GATS. The ECJ’s interpretation of the notion of “for remuneration” has been 
that it does not require the supply of a service with the intention of making a profi t. See, for 
example, G Davies, ‘Welfare as a Service’ (2002) 29(1) Legal Issues of Economic Integration 
27, 30: “Profi t as a marker of economic services ... is dead … At most it may serve a very 
general indicator of an economic outlook, which may be useful where it is not clear if money 
changing hands is in fact consideration or not”. On the contrary, the GATS wording of “on 
a commercial basis” would seem clearly to point to a profi t-making intention. The relevance 
of this issue for the interpretational value to GATS law of EC services case law (some other 
aspects of which are discussed in section 4.1 below) would seem worthy of further analysis, 
for which there is no space here.
78 Krajewski (n 26) 353. 
118 John Morijn: Economic Liberalisation of Education Provision within the EC & WTO: A Human...
may well come to be seen as not exempt from the sectoral scope of GATS, 
and interpreted as not “supplied in exercise of governmental authority”. 
In that light, there is a real possibility that under GATS the provision of 
(parts of) education will be characterised, and treated, as a service.79
3.3 An initial human rights perspective of the economic liberalisation 
of education provision 
A good starting point for a human rights analysis of the liberalisa-
tion of trade in services is the observation that very little is known about 
the interplay of GATS and human rights in general terms. After all, GATS 
is a relatively recent treaty that came into force only in the middle of 
the 1990s. A fascinating attempt for human rights lawyers and develop-
ment economics to fi nd common ground concluded that a review of GATS 
should be conducted to identify intersections between GATS and the im-
plementation of economic and social rights.80 This section will take up 
that challenge by attempting to provide some initial lines of thought on 
the interface of economic liberalisation and education provision.
Interestingly, the WTO Secretariat itself has acknowledged that “giv-
en its importance for human and social development, countries through-
out the world tend to consider instruction up to a certain level - com-
monly primary and secondary education - as basic entitlement”.81 The 
question then is, of course, what states should be doing in the context of 
trade negotiations and adjudication to act upon the legal obligation cor-
responding to the individual entitlements, and how to go about fi nding 
this out. In the remainder of this section, it is proposed to look mainly at 
the human right to education, fully aware that this is a somewhat simpli-
fi ed picture, as many other human rights norms could also play a role.82
Even if there already are “quite a few countries where education 
is both a right and a traded service”,83 a pragmatic way of beginning a 
human rights law analysis would be to study what the most important 
reasons are for avoiding commitment in education services at this stage. 
These have been identifi ed as relating, fi rstly, to uncertainty about the 
scope and nature of GATS obligations, and, secondly, the likelihood of, 
79 Ibid 358.
80 R Balakrishnan, ‘Why MES with Human Rights? Integrating Macro Economic Strategies 
with Human Rights’ <http://www.policyinnovations.org/media/1189_Why_MES_with_Hu-
man_Rights.pdf> (38) accessed 17 October 2005.
81 WTO, Education Services - Background Note by the Secretariat’(23 September 1998) S/
C/W/49 3.
82 For example, those relating to participation in cultural life and non-discrimination. For 
a recent analysis of the latter issue in the context of education, see LS Bibbings, ‘Widening 
Participation and Higher Education’ (2006) 33(1) Journal of Law and Society 74.
83 Tomasevski (n 31) 5.
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and conditions for, governments wanting to adopt future policies in edu-
cation that may be inconsistent with specifi c commitments in GATS.84 
A fi rst general point about GATS’ potential bite regarding public serv-
ices is that its focus seems to be on the particular activities, and not on 
the institution providing them. In other words, GATS mainly has a func-
tional concern, not an institutional one.85 Therefore, it was rightly ob-
served that it is misplaced to think that once, say, a university develops 
one commercial service, all its other activities provided non-commercially 
and non-competitively will be affected and equally considered a service 
(and therefore impossible to “protect” by exclusion from GATS’s scope). 
As Adlung has written, “Article I:3 refers explicitly to the conditions gov-
erning the supply of a particular service and not to its overall role within 
a supplier’s accounting system or to the existence of remunerative activi-
ties that might be conducted in parallel”.86 
Another particularly relevant issue from the point of view of human 
rights with regard to scope concerns the status of privatised education 
provision. Privatisation challenges the traditionally state-centred premis-
es of both international trade law and human rights law. It has been 
correctly written that “… the liberalisation of trade in education services 
does not per se bring privatisation of education…”.87 However, this does 
not diminish the issue of the applicability of the public services exemp-
tion of Article I:3 GATS as one that is especially hard to assess now that 
more and more states chose to privatise some of these services.88 On 
the other hand, it has been argued that the “constructive ambiguity” of 
Article I:3(b)/(c) GATS still effectively hides a state-centred anchoring of 
the exemption, namely as a result of the combination of the functional 
wording (“on a commercial basis/in competition”) with the implicit insti-
tutional wording (“governmental”): “This could prompt speculation about 
a third [and hidden] criterion [in Article I:3 GATS], the direct participation 
of a governmental agency”.89 
This requires us to address the diffi cult issue of privatisation in hu-
man rights law, and in particular with regard to the right to education. 
As has been well written about this issue generally, 
84 Van Duzer (n 34). 
85 Adlung (n 41) 455.
86 Ibid 463.
87 F Coomans and AHallo De Wolf, ‘Privatisation of Education and the Right to Education’ in 
K De Feyter and F Gomez Isa (eds), Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisa-
tion (Intersentia, Antwerp 2005) 252.
88 Leroux (n 70) 385.
89 Adlung (n 41) 466 (emphasis added).
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privatisation … makes the connection between payment and … pro-
vision more visible, but it need not make access to basic … services 
dependent on people’s ability to pay … what matters, from a human 
rights perspective, is the suffi ciency of … basic services … private 
and state-run systems of [basic service] delivery are at similar risk of 
failure [or success] in this regard.90 
As with all human rights, the right to receive education is primarily 
directed at the state, and therefore only obliges governments to provide, 
or to allow for adequate educational facilities. However, in line with the 
above quotation, this does not mean - perhaps contrary to widespread 
belief in human rights circles - that all schools, vocational training insti-
tutions, and universities must be established and maintained by the gov-
ernment exclusively.91 If there are suffi cient private facilities, a state may 
fulfi l its human rights protection obligations by ensuring that all condi-
tions laid down in international law, such as those relating to education 
provision or general and equal access to secondary and higher education, 
are guaranteed by means of, for example, legislative measures, state su-
pervision, and subsidies.92 
On the other hand, this implies - perhaps contrary to widespread be-
lief in trade economics circles - that human rights law does require states 
to take appropriate steps to prepare for a changed role, from supplier/
provider to supervisor/regulator93 of the provision of education if this has 
happened or is planned.94 This is also to be checked by courts. The Euro-
pean Court of Human Rights, for example, has ruled that a state cannot 
absolve itself from responsibility by delegating its obligations to private 
school bodies,95 in particular since it has been correctly pointed out that 
90 MG Bloche, ‘Is Privatisation of Health Care a Human Rights Problem?’ in K De Feyter and 
F Gomez Isa (eds), Privatisation and Human Rights in the Age of Globalisation (Intersentia, 
Antwerp 2005) 219. See also G Davies, ‘The Process and Side-Effects of Harmonisation of 
European Welfare States’ (2006) Jean Monnet Working Paper 02/06 <http://www.jean-
monnetprogram.org/papers/06/060201.pdf> (7) accessed 3 October 2006: “[I]t is possible 
for private providers within a well-enough regulated market to provide good quality services, 
even in a sensitive area such as welfare… [The narrow functional point is that] good … edu-
cation ... can be provided to a population by institutions not owned by the state, but subject 
to regulation imposing certain obligations of equality and universality.” 
91 M Nowak, ‘The Right to Education’ in A Eide et al. (eds), Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights - a Textbook (Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht 1995) 200-201.
92 Ibid.
93 For this terminology, see C Graham, ‘Human Rights and the Privatisation of Public Utili-
ties and Essential Services’ in K De Feyter and F Gomez Isa (eds), Privatisation and Human 
Rights in the Age of Globalisation (Intersentia, Antwerp 2005).
94 Steketee (n 38) 203: “Countries that open trade in ... services must also consider an 
altered role for the state in overseeing the delivery of these services … the state is likely to 
take a more regulatory role to ensure the service is delivered as needed….”
95 Coomans and Hallo De Wolf (n 87) 235.
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a freer market may in some ways require closer supervision.96 There is no 
reason not to seek global application of this reasoning.
Importantly then, by way of an interim observation, the GATS word-
ing of “governmental authority” (“pouvoir gouvernemental”/“facultades 
gubernamentales”) seems able to accommodate the requirement of hu-
man rights law that a state needs to maintain a measure of control with-
out necessarily institutionally supplying a service itself. The terminology 
of “authority” would seem suffi ciently wide to facilitate the more super-
visory obligations of the state if privatisation is opted for. As a matter of 
human rights law, the possible implicit “direct participation” element of 
Article I:3(b)/(c) GATS as identifi ed by Adlung is functional, not institu-
tional.
Second, there is also an important human rights law aspect in the 
assessment of the likelihood of, and conditions for, governments want-
ing to adopt future policies in education that may be inconsistent with 
specifi c commitments in GATS. It has been written by OECD offi cials that 
“each country is free to decide nationally to what extent it will publicly 
fi nance higher education for its own citizens … this prerogative cannot 
be called into question by the development of trade in education services, 
nor by GATS negotiations on liberalisation”.97 The point about this obser-
vation is that, from a human rights perspective, it misses the point. Here 
we need to refer back to the remark made in section 2 to the effect that, 
from an international human rights perspective, reference to national 
autonomy may ring hollow. This is particularly so since, in the context 
of public services, what is at stake is the right of access to the service, 
which requires an active stance of a state.98 In this case, a state is not 
“free” to do what it pleases, but is bound by a positive obligation to offer 
what is required by norms relating to education provision, including the 
provision of “free” education.
At this point it then becomes necessary to look in more detail at the 
human right to education, and the way in which it has been interpreted. 
The core of the right to education under international law is constituted 
by the right of every human being, and of children in particular, to receive 
education.99 Education rights are dependent on various factors, as has 
been clarifi ed by the Committee monitoring compliance with the Interna-
tional Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). For 
education rights to be suffi ciently guaranteed, they must be available, 
96 Davies (n 90) 53.
97 Larsen and Vincent-Lancrin (n 43) 27 (see also Chanda (n 58) 2005: “governments are 
free to defi ne and treat government services as they decide… they do not need to notify or 
explain their defi nition”).
98 Graham (n 93). 
99 Nowak (n 91) 198-199.
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accessible to all (physically, economically, and in a non-discriminatory 
way), acceptable (relevant, culturally appropriate, and of good quality) 
and adaptable to diverse social and cultural settings.100 In other words, 
while education can be instrumental in making declared rights effective 
within societies, education rights for all can only be fully operational in 
the context of wider rights of non-discrimination and of the recognition of 
cultural and social diversity.101
It is instructive to study the wording of the human right to education 
as present in the UDHR,102 the ICESCR,103 and the CRC.104 A fi rst com-
mon feature is the break-up in levels of education which conveniently 
coincides with the GATS classifi cation. Moreover, it seems clear that the 
main requirement of the right to education relates to its provision free of 
100 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 13, The Right to 
Education (December 1999) E/C.12/1999/10 para 6.
101 C Wallace and J Shaw, ‘Education, Multiculturalism and the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights of the European Union’ in TK Hervey and J Kenner (eds), Economic and Social Rights 
under the Eu Charter of Fundamental Rights - A Legal Perspective (Hart Publishing, Oxford 
2003) 238.
102 Article 26 Universal Declaration of Human Rights
1. Everyone has the right to education. Education shall be free, at least in the elementary 
and fundamental stages. Elementary education shall be compulsory. Technical and profes-
sional education shall be made generally available and higher education shall be equally 
accessible to all on the basis of merit…. 
103 Article 13 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
1. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise the right of everyone to education. 
….. 
2. The States Parties to the present Covenant recognise that, with a view to achieving the 
full realization of this right: 
(a) Primary education shall be compulsory and available free to all; 
(b) Secondary education in its different forms, including technical and vocational second-
ary education, shall be made generally available and accessible to all by every appropriate 
means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; 
(c) Higher education shall be made equally accessible to all, on the basis of capacity, by eve-
ry appropriate means, and in particular by the progressive introduction of free education; 
(d) Fundamental education shall be encouraged or intensifi ed as far as possible for those 
persons who have not received or completed the whole period of their primary education; 
….
104 Article 28 Convention on the Rights of the Child
1. States Parties recognise the right of the child to education, and with a view to achieving 
this right progressively and on the basis of equal opportunity, they shall, in particular: 
(a) Make primary education compulsory and available free to all; 
(b) Encourage the development of different forms of secondary education, including general 
and vocational education, make them available and accessible to every child, and take ap-
propriate measures such as the introduction of free education and offering fi nancial assist-
ance in case of need; 
(c) Make higher education accessible to all on the basis of capacity by every appropriate 
means; ….
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charge. This term comprises direct, indirect, and opportunity costs, and 
points to the governmental obligation to eliminate all those costs that 
preclude the completion of schooling.105 
Problematically, however, the mentioned human rights treaties have 
strikingly different requirement in this regard. The UDHR requires free 
provision of primary and adult education. The ICESCR requires immedi-
ate free provision of primary education (Article 13(2)(a) and the progres-
sive introduction of free secondary education, vocational training (Article 
13(2)(b)) and higher education (Article 13(2)(c)). The CRC is similar to the 
ICESCR, with the exception that it does not mention the introduction of 
the free provision of higher education (although this may be explained by 
the fact that people usually embark upon higher education once they are 
no longer a child, and hence stop being covered by the CRC). It should 
be stressed that this is a legal problem, in light of the wide ratifi cation 
amongst WTO Members of the ICESCR and CRC. On the other hand, the 
requirement of “free provision” is also of a surprisingly economic nature, 
which could be interpreted that the fi nancing cannot under any circum-
stances be based in any signifi cant part on contributions of those receiv-
ing primary and secondary education. 
The most relevant aspect of this legal dilemma, to which the discus-
sion will be limited here, is the status of the progressive introduction of 
free higher education. With regard to the requirement of provision free of 
charge, the CESCR has stated, initially with regard to primary education, 
that fees imposed by the Government, the local authorities or the school, 
and other direct costs, constitute disincentives to the enjoyment of the 
right, and may jeopardise its realisation, and that they are often highly 
regressive in effect.106 It has later characterised this as its general under-
standing of what the obligation of “free” envisages,107 i.e. it also applies to 
other levels of education. Of particular relevance here is that it has not 
qualifi ed its view of this meaning with regard to higher education.108 As a 
logical fl ip-side to this line of reasoning, the CESCR has pointed out that 
the principle of progressive realisation means that, at the very least, cur-
rent levels of free provision cannot be rolled back.109 
105 Tomasevski (n 31) 16.
106 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 11, Plans of Ac-
tion for Primary Education (May 1999) E/C.12/1999/4 para 7.
107 Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment 13, The Right to 
Education (December 1999) E/C.12/1999/10 para 14.
108 Ibid para 20. See, however, S Grover, ‘Secondary Education as a Universal Human Right’ 
(2004) 16(1) Education and the Law 21, 21, who claims that “there is … no legal obligation 
stipulated in international human rights law for the States Parties to the UN Conventions 
to provide free, compulsory education to the end of secondary school”. The author does 
not, however, refer to the ICESCR (only to the UDHR and the CRC), nor does she explain or 
justify this omission. 
109 3D (n 30) 53-54.
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In that light, there seems to be genuine scope for tension between 
progressive economic liberalisation and the progressive realisation of so-
cial human rights, particularly given that patterns of (re-)introduction of 
charges show that they generally result from poverty.110 This argues in 
favour of clearly circumscribing the way in which higher education pro-
vision should be subject to GATS, and particularly in the situation of a 
developed country seeking access to the education provision “markets” of 
developing countries. 
On the other hand, there may also be scope to give a less rigid (and 
perhaps more pragmatic) meaning to “free” provision that would focus 
less on the level of subsidy, but instead give parallel weight to the soci-
etal context of this individual entitlement (e.g. the economic situation of 
the family, social and ethnic origin, etc.).111 This more contextual under-
standing of “free provision” may facilitate an escape from the paradoxical 
terminological straightjacket of an overly economic nature, in that it can 
help argue the case more from the basis of the rationale of access to the 
education system. Rigid insistence on the requirement of education “for 
free” may lead to losing sight of the fact that, for both the individual and 
society, fi nancing education is the (necessary) means to an end, not the 
end in itself. 
Even if the above may suggest that human rights functionally condi-
tion the way in which education can be (allowed to be) provided in market 
conditions, it is worth stressing that this need not lead to a priori exemp-
tion from economic liberalisation. For one thing, there may be plenty of 
room for gaining fl exibility and effi ciency112 within the enormous budgets 
already available for education. Human rights protection as such does 
not stand in the way of states’ political choices to privatise education, to 
free its hands for other tasks, nor to allow in foreign providers. A correct 
understanding of the requirement of movement toward progressive “free” 
provision would, however, force a state to insist, as general regulator, 
that the fi nancial contribution required of students would not be raised 
in a way that would be at odds with the rationale of access to education 
for all. 
On the basis of this type of consideration, some commentators have 
proposed elements for what could be seen as a human rights precaution-
110 As the former special rapporteur on the right to education has argued: “Supplanting 
previously free by for-fee education is ... the biggest challenge to education as a human 
right … progressive liberalisation of trade in education … is replacing progressive liberalisa-
tion of economic, social, and cultural rights ... unless this is effectively countered, we may 
continue talking about economic, social, and cultural rights but purchasing power will have 
replaced entitlements”; Tomaševski (n 24) 710. See also Tomasevski (n 31) 24.
111 Cf. Bibbings (n 82). 
112 Coomans and Hallo De Wolf (n 87) 242.
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ary principle in the context of trade liberalisation. As Koen de Feyter has 
written:
“From a human rights perspective, it is essential that GATS negotia-
tors: (i) delay opening markets in human-rights-sensitive services to 
private foreign operators until they have ensured that the domestic le-
gal system provides the specifi c human rights protection necessary to 
prevent and redress the potential adverse human rights impacts of the 
liberalisation/privatisation process; and (ii) ensure that GATS commit-
ments are drafted in such a way that the state preserves the necessary 
regulatory capability to comply with its human rights duties after the 
relevant service has been brought under the GATS scheme”.113
Finally, then, in this section of the paper, it has been argued that 
a human rights perspective of trade and non-trade does not have a pre-
set opinion of the virtue of trade liberalisation, but pragmatically considers 
case by case. Yeates has pointed to an interesting situation where trade law 
non-discrimination may coincide with human rights non-discrimination, 
because whereas “temporary migrant workers are often required to pay tax-
es for a public service without a corresponding entitlement to receiving ben-
efi ts… one of the possible effects of the GATS … is its potential to improve 
entitlement to social public services of temporary migrant workers”.114
4. Economic liberalisation of education provision in the EC context 
Looking at the same type of issues in the EC setting may for a mo-
ment leave an observer entirely alienated. For all its obvious legal and sys-
tematic similarities, the EC discussion progresses in a parallel universe. 
Nonetheless, it will be attempted next to appreciate EC developments in 
terms of the impact of economic liberalisation on education provision. Al-
though many more different aspects of EU law may be relevant to the hu-
man rights analysis of the liberalisation of education services in the EC 
context - such as free movement of workers, and the EC’s competences 
in the fi eld of education - this paper will give a fl avour of the nature and 
state of the EC debate through a very simplifi ed juxtaposition of ECJ 
services case law with the provisions on common commercial policy. 
4.1 The nature and state of the discussion of EC economic 
liberalisation vs. education provision through a discussion of ECJ 
case law and common commercial policy provisions 
Rapid development is taking place in case law concerning the way 
the provision of public services is subject to Article 49 EC. As was pointed 
113 De Feyter (n 32) 202.
114 Yeates (n 35) 18.
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out earlier, the ECJ has ruled that the provision of national education, 
as long as it is largely fi nanced from the public purse, is not a service 
and therefore not subject to the EC legal discipline of free movement of 
services.115 A regime not seeking gainful activity but fulfi lling a duty to-
wards the population in social, cultural and educational fi elds does not 
constitute a service.116 With regard to the terminology of “largely”, it has 
been suggested that education retains its non-economic nature as long 
as a majority of funds are of public origin.117 Therefore, this also implies 
that states need to continue to pay for most of education provision if 
they intend to keep this public service excluded from the EC services 
discipline.118 A second element of the formula is the suggestion that it is 
somehow of signifi cance that a state fulfi ls its duty to its population.119 
A fi rst qualifi cation of this Humbel/Wirth position on education pro-
vision is that the exclusion from the application of the economic law gov-
erning services is likely still only to hold water for public education. In the 
recent Neri, the organisation for remuneration of university courses by a 
private educational institution was characterised as an economic activity 
by the ECJ, and thus interpreted as subject to the discipline covered by 
the freedom of establishment.120 This presumably means, although the 
ECJ did not itself explicitly state this, that organisation for remunera-
tion of university courses by a private educational institution will also be 
characterised as service provision.121 This would be an important fi nding, 
as it would make such private education provision subject to the full 
force and logic of economic law, and therefore condition how states can 
regulate this policy-area.122  
115 See n 1. 
116 Ibid. See also Krajewski (n 26) 362.
117 Davies (n 77) 31.
118 As observed by A Gerbrandy, JW van de Gronden and B Hessel, ‘Marktwerking in het 
onderwijs - En Europa dan? (Competition in the education sector - What About Europe?)’ 
(2005) 35 Nederlands Juristenblad. See also Davies (n 77) 31.
119 This point will be taken up in the next subsection.
120 Case C-153/02 Valentina Neri v European School of Economics (ESE Insight World Educa-
tion System Ltd). [2003] ECR I-13555 para 39.
121 This was specifi cally concluded by AG Jacobs in this case; opinion AG Jacobs, case 
C-153/02 Valentina Neri para 46. Another argument that the holding in Neri would likely 
lead to a characterisation as service of private higher education is that it could trigger the 
Court’s argumentation in Wirth (n 1) para 17, to the effect that where a higher education es-
tablishment was fi nanced essentially out of private funds, such as students’ fees or parents’ 
contributions, and sought to make a profi t, it could then be a service provider; Cf. Davies (n 
77) 29 (describing this part of the Wirth-reasoning as obiter dictum).
122 It should be added here that there are of course many rules of EC primary law other 
than the four freedoms that infl uence how states can regulate their education system. For 
a recent case in which the Court overturned a national system’s education regulations 
amounting to discrimination on the grounds of nationality, see Case C-147/03 Commission 
of the European Communities v Republic of Austria [2005] ECR I-5969. For a case in which 
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This leads us to a second observation. Of great relevance for our 
discussion is that the ECJ has held that public services other than, but 
in some respects very similar to, public education provision fall within 
the scope of the EC Treaty provisions on the freedom to provide services. 
In particular, even if the ECJ was invited to exclude it in line with the 
abovementioned Humbel reasoning,123 the Court has in fact recently le-
gally qualifi ed the provision of public health care as a service in a series 
of cases.124 It now considers the sector as a whole to consist of activity of 
an economic nature, whether involving public or private institutions.125 
This means that concerns such as those relating to the viability of the 
public service provision, or the increased costs resulting from opening 
the national system, can only be considered at the stage of exception and 
justifi cation for restrictions to the freedom of provision of services.126 This 
could have a number of important strategic and substantive disadvan-
tages for those in charge of safeguarding the public service, as they fi nd 
themselves placed in a defensive position127 and forced to phrase their 
concerns in terms of legal arguments not essentially based in welfare law 
or policy.128 
The exclusion of public education provision from the legal discipline 
of free movement of services has therefore become increasingly odd in 
the Court overturned a national system’s education regulations on the ground of the citi-
zenship provision of article 18 EC, see Case C-209/03 The Queen (on the application of Dany 
Bidar) v London Borough of Ealing and Secretary of State for Education and Skills [2005] ECR 
I-2119. For a good analysis of this type of case, see G Davies, ‘Higher Education, Equal Ac-
cess, And Residence Conditions: Does EU Law Allow Member States to Charge Higher Fees 
To Students Not Previously Resident?’ (2005) 12(3) Maastricht Journal of European and 
Comparative Law 227. The point addressed in this section is solely that of the EC law status 
of education provision under the EC freedom to provide services. This narrow focus is cho-
sen both for the purpose of comparative legal assessment of the EC and WTO legal situation 
with regard to public services as well as for the purpose of appreciating the consistency of 
EC Member States’ behaviour with regard to this issue in the context of the WTO. 
123 Opinion of AG Ruiz-Jarabo Colomer, case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting 
Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR 
I-5473.
124 See, for example, case C-158/96 Raymond Kohll v Union des caisses de maladie [1998] 
ECR I-1931, case C-368/98 Abdon Vanbraekel and Others v Alliance nationale des mutuali-
tés chrétiennes (ANMC) [2001] ECR I-5363, case C-157/99 B.S.M. Geraets-Smits v Stichting 
Ziekenfonds VGZ and H.T.M. Peerbooms v Stichting CZ Groep Zorgverzekeringen [2001] ECR 
I-5473, case C-385/99 V.G. Müller-Fauré v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij OZ Zorgverze-
keringen UA and E.E.M. van Riet v Onderlinge Waarborgmaatschappij ZAO Zorgverzekerin-
gen [2003] ECR I-4509, and case C-372/04 The Queen, on the application of Yvonne Watts 
v Bedford Primary Care Trust and Secretary of State for Health, ECJ judgment of 16 May 
2006.
125 Davies (n 90) 20. 
126 Davies (n 77) 37. 
127 Davies (n 90) 29. 
128 Ibid 5. 
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the light of the far-reaching subjection of the provision of health care. In 
fact, the developments in the judicial appreciation of the public service of 
health care provision raise the issue of the very remaining value of Hum-
bel as a precedent with regard to the activity in the context of which it 
was decided: public education provision.129 It has been argued that since 
the Humbel ruling, the contribution of fees to funding has become more 
important and the behaviour of universities more competitive and mar-
ket-like.130 For example, most postgraduate courses are now of an eco-
nomic nature.131 More generally, it has been suggested that the process of 
harmonisation of national education systems is at an earlier stage than 
that of health care provision, without there being important conceptual 
differences.132 This would suggest that it is only a matter of time for pub-
lic education to be characterised as an economic activity, and therefore 
as a service.
The core question at this stage therefore is this: are there elements 
that inherently distinguish education provision from health care provi-
sion, and the concomitant role of the state in such provision? It will be 
suggested here that education is indeed importantly different, and should 
be treated as such. In the next subsection, an attempt will be made to 
further strengthen this viewpoint with reference to human rights.
A fi rst difference between health and education provision is that in 
the context of higher education remuneration may be harder to locate as 
a result of cross-subsidy between faculties and between different func-
tions and sources of funds within faculties.133 In a recent Opinion, AG 
Jacobs pointed at two further differences between public health provi-
sion and public education provision when he argued that “patients move 
across borders more as a matter of necessity, whereas students do so 
more as a matter of choice ... also ... patients move to receive specifi c 
medical treatment after which they return to their home state … students 
on the other hand stay for the whole period of their studies, participate in 
the local social and cultural life and … will tend to integrate in the host 
Member State”.134 While the general validity of his fi rst observation of a 
structural nature may actually be directly questioned,135 the second more 
129 Opinion of AG Geelhoed, case C-372/04 Watts, delivered on 15 December 2005, para 
60: “...disregarding whether Humbel may still be regarded as good law...”.
130 Davies (n 90) 21. 
131 Davies (n 77) 32.
132 Davies (n 90) 24. 
133 Ibid 21. 
134 Opinion of AG Jacobs, case C-147/03 Commission v. Austria [2005] ECR I-5969 para 
35. 
135 For example, many German students come to the Netherlands as they cannot study the 
subject of their choice in their home country for reason of a numerus fi xus. 
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principled issue may lead to the core of the difference between health 
care and education. 
Of all public services, education may have the greatest cultural and 
social cohesive force. To paraphrase Davies here, “state provision of edu-
cation could be seen as a part of the essential structure of the state” and 
“an element of national composition”.136 As he explains well,137 the collec-
tive bonding coming from a shared educational experience resulting from 
enjoying one’s student life within state schools and universities is lost 
when education provision becomes too fragmented and diversifi ed. It is 
indeed the case that “the effect of this, and of losing it, should not be un-
derestimated”138 even if the quality of the education nation-wide is sus-
tained - or perhaps even when raised by a certain degree, in a scenario 
that it would benefi t individuals but at a greater cost to society at large. 
In other words, due to education’s specifi c nature in forming indi-
viduals and shaping societies, it is argued that there are important rea-
sons to maintain the exclusion of public education provision from the EC 
services law discipline. 
An interesting recent addition to this internal debate is the negotia-
tion on the Bolkestein Directive about further liberalisation of the EC 
services markets. The European Parliament’s Legislative Resolution139 
clearly aimed at excluding education provision from the scope of the pro-
posed directive. Its recital 16 sums up the Parliament’s view:
The concept of service covers any economic activity normally pro-
vided for remuneration. The characteristic of remuneration is absent 
in the case of activities performed, for no consideration, by the State 
… in the context of their duties in the ... educational fi eld..., whether 
at public or private educational establishments… These activities 
are not covered by the defi nition of “service” and do not therefore fall 
within the scope of this Directive.140 
136 Davies (n 90) pp 36 and 61.
137 Ibid 50. 
138 Ibid.
139 European Parliament Legislative resolution on the proposal for a directive of the Parlia-
ment and the Council on services in the internal market (16 February 2006).
140 See also, for example: 
- new recital 7c): “… educational … services typically pursuing social welfare objectives 
should not be affected by the provisions of this directive”
- new recital 8a): “… as regards services of general interest, this Directive covers only ser-
vices that correspond to an economic activity and are open to competition”
- adapted recital 15: “The payment of a fee by recipients in order to make a certain contribu-
tion to the operating expenses of a system does not in itself imply remuneration because the 
service is still essentially fi nanced by public funds.”
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Much of the legal strength of this claim seems lost, however, when 
recital 24 attempts to add education to the list of mandatory require-
ments, which implies, of course, that education provision is believed 
to be covered by the scope of the services directive, for otherwise there 
would be no need for exclusion through an exceptions clause.141 It should 
be noted, however, that this seeming contradiction of mentioning educa-
tion both in the context of exclusion from the scope of the EC services 
law discipline and as a mandatory requirement is sustained in the more 
recent Common Position adopted by the Council.142 
In striking contrast to (public) education provision’s apparent exclu-
sion from the EC services law discipline, the common commercial policy 
provisions of the current EC Treaty lay down the possibility of committing 
to liberalising education services, although according to a particularly 
burdensome procedure. Article 133(6), para. 2 EC reads: “Agreements 
relating to ... educational services ... shall fall within the shared compe-
tence of the Community and its Member States. [I]n addition to a Com-
munity decision taken in accordance with … Article 300 EC, the negotia-
tion of such agreement shall require the common accord of the Member 
States”. 
EU countries have made commitments for privately funded educa-
tion institutions in all subsectors except “other”.143 The EC has not (yet) 
offered commitments with regard to publicly fi nanced education serv-
ices.144 The proposed EC revised offer in the Doha negotiations took pride 
in not containing commitments in “sensitive areas” such as education.145 
Equally, the EC request in the current global trade negotiations stated 
that it “does not seek commitments that would dismantle public serv-
ices”.146 Realistically, however, in the current political setting it is far 
141 It is possible that recital 24 is a slip of the pen, as the addition to mandatory require-
ments is inconsistently done throughout the text of the Legislative Resolution, e.g. educa-
tion is not added in new recital 27, and in particular it is not added in amended recital 29 
which has a very long list of overriding reasons relating to public interest.
142 Common Position adopted by the Council with a view to the adoption of a Directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council on services in the internal market [2006] Doc 
10003/06, in recitals 34 and 40 respectively.
143 Saner and Fasel (n 48) 284.
144 Krajewski (n 26) 359. This important fact of partial commitment (only private education) 
is lost on Tomasevski, who suggests wrongly that the EC has made full commitments in the 
area of education, cf. Tomasevski (n 31) 13.
145 Revised offer on services (20 April 2005)<http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/docs/2005/
april/tradoc_122676.pdf> 
146 Request in the service negotiations (25 January 2005) <http://trade-info.cec.eu.int/
doclib/docs/2005/january/tradoc_121197.pdf> (announcing, however, that “only the US 
would receive a request on higher education services but strictly limited to privately-funded 
education services”). One author has, however, argued that the request addressed to the US 
“has to be interpreted as a clever move to signal willingness to negotiate in the education 
fi eld”; Scherrer (n 47) 502. 
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from unlikely that the EC will start seeking commitments in these areas, 
in particular from developing countries as “compensation” for EC “sacri-
fi ces” in the fi eld of agriculture.147
The contrast between internal case law and externally orientated 
rules regarding economic liberalisation vs. education provision has only 
increased with the CT. While Article III-145 CT sustains the precise word-
ing of the current Article 50, fi rst sentence EC on which the ECJ has 
based its case law, the provisions of the common commercial policy have, 
however, been changed as compared to the EC Treaty currently in force. 
The CT proposes far-reaching adaptations in the common commercial 
policy provisions, including with regard to education services. Article III-
315(4), para. 3, under (b) reads: “The Council shall … act unanimously 
for the negotiation and conclusion of agreements … in the fi eld of trade in 
... education ... services, where these agreements risk seriously disturbing 
the national organisation of such services and prejudicing the responsibil-
ity of Member States to deliver them…”.148 The wording that only a “risk of 
seriously disturbing the national organisation of education services” will 
justify unanimity voting149 can be taken as signifying a political determi-
nation for future EC action on education services. 
Article III-315(4), para. 3 was changed at the last minute from the 
version agreed upon within the European Convention. More particularly, 
initially it was also agreed that unanimity in concluding agreements re-
garding liberalisation of education services should be required. Krajewski 
has noted that since many members had repeatedly called for unanim-
ity, the initial “Giscard” draft “represented the will of a large group, pos-
sibly even the majority of the Convention” that came to be overruled by 
the European Council.150 On the other hand, economic liberalisation of 
education provision is hardly a new item on the European agenda. The 
European Roundtable of Industrialists, a corporate lobby group, already 
declared in 1998 that “the provision of education is a market opportunity 
and should be treated as such”.151
4.2 A human rights perspective of internal and external EC activities 
in the economic liberalisation/education provision nexus 
Even the most superfi cial look will reveal that human rights have 
been given a more visible place in the CT. This is an open invitation to 
147 Scherrer (n 47) 500.
148 Emphasis added.
149 Emphasis added. The wording implies a fall-back to qualifi ed majority voting (art III-
315(4) para 1) if “seriously disturbing” is not established.
150 M Krajewski, ‘External Trade Law and the Constitution Treaty: Towards a Federal and 
More Democratic Common Commercial Policy?’ (2005) 42 CMLRev 91, 121. 
151 Steketee (n 38) fn 152.
132 John Morijn: Economic Liberalisation of Education Provision within the EC & WTO: A Human...
assess whether a clearer human rights perspective can be articulated for 
the purpose of positioning oneself in the internal economic liberalisation/
education provision debate. The human rights now placed at the heart 
of the CT were substantively copied from the Charter of Fundamental 
Rights drafted in 2000. Also the “explanations” that were adopted in par-
allel to the Charter now appear in attachment to the CT (albeit at times in 
a slightly amended form) in the shape of a Declaration. 
For the purpose of our discussion it is interesting to provide the 
wording of the provision on education in full, precisely because it has 
been described as a “slightly odd little pot pourri”:152
Article 14 EU Charter
1. Everyone has the right to education and to have access to voca-
tional and continuing training.
2. This right includes the possibility to receive free compulsory edu-
cation…
3. The freedom to found educational establishments...
Explanation to Article 14 Charter
1. This Article is based on the common constitutional traditions of 
Member States and on Article 2 of the fi rst Protocol to the ECHR....
It was considered useful to extend this article to access to vocational 
and continuing training… and to add the principle of free compul-
sory education. As it is worded, the latter principle merely implies 
that as regards compulsory education, each child has the possibility 
of attending an establishment which offers free education. It does 
not require all establishments which provide education or vocation-
al and continuing training, in particular private ones, to be free of 
charge. Nor does it exclude certain specifi c forms of education hav-
ing to be paid for, if the State takes measures to grant fi nancial com-
pensation. Insofar as the Charter applies to the Union, this means 
that in its training policies the Union must respect free compulsory 
education… 
2. Freedom to found public or private educational establishments is 
guaranteed as one of the aspects of freedom to conduct a business 
but it is limited by respect for democratic principles and is exercised 
in accordance with the arrangements defi ned by national legislation.
A fi rst observation is that, on comparison, the international human 
rights law provisions on education are much broader than the Charter’s 
152 Wallace and Shaw (n 101) 223.
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wording. As was indicated in section 3, the principle of free compulsory 
education only implies that each child in compulsory (primary and sec-
ondary) education should have the right to attend a school free of charge. 
This wording can be taken to imply that under the Charter there is no 
right to the provision of higher and adult education free of charge.153 
Moreover, the Charter does not include the requirement to progressively 
introduce free education in higher education. Therefore, it is narrower in 
scope than the ICESCR in terms of accessibility.154 
Perhaps a more intriguing aspect of the explanations is the phrasing 
in the second paragraph that can be read as saying that also the freedom 
to found a public school is an aspect of the freedom to conduct a busi-
ness. If this is meant to imply that running a public school can be seen 
as an “ordinary” economic activity, this can be viewed as at odds with the 
ECJ’s public education provision case law discussed above.  
In that light, it is worth restating from a wider international human 
rights viewpoint in what way education provision can be seen as espe-
cially important for a society. Complementary invocation of human rights 
may equip Member States seeking to resist economic law subjection with 
arguments based on these norms that have now gained additional stand-
ing in EC law. Tomasevski has summarised well the nature of the right 
to education:  
[T]he right to education unlocks other rights when guaranteed, while 
its denial leads to compounded denials of other human rights … The 
economic rationale for the right to education [has always been] - and 
remains - that investment in education should be made by the govern-
ments because it yields economic returns … Moreover, education is not 
only, not even mainly, about the transmission of knowledge and skills … 
Education is a public good because it represents the most widespread 
form of institutionalised socialisation of children. 155
In that light, a state could argue on the basis of the Humbel formula 
that the protection of the human rights to education is a duty that it ful-
fi ls toward, and is bound to protect for, its population - and perhaps to 
the exclusion of too great a number of non-national economic agents and 
individuals. 
More generally, it is of course understandable that arguments in 
justifi cation/exemption by states may often look as if they are “refl exively 
conservative”.156 Yet, it should not be forgotten that conservatism may 
equally be “conservationist” of a situation that is the fruit of past social 
153 Ibid 235-236.
154 Ibid. 
155 Tomasevski (n 31) 74.
156 Davies (n 90) 28. 
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progressiveness. The merit of invoking a need for conservation depends 
on the state of social development already reached and the attempts made 
to preserve it. While there is nothing sacred about a national cultural or 
social status quo, one should be extremely careful in approaching very 
complex matters defi ning the structure of a state and national society 
solely through the prism of economic liberty. If the fear is solely that an 
exclusionary and defi nite “defi nition of … social services, or a distinction 
between economic and non-economic services based on goal or character 
rather than organisation would encourage states ... to portray ever-more 
activities as ‘social’ in order to benefi t from the right to protectionism”,157 
human rights can perhaps be seen as an additional tool by the ECJ to 
assess the nature of the state’s claim. The right to protectionism and the 
duty to protect its population (in the sense of Humbel) must go hand in 
hand.
The increased relevance that the CT seemingly attaches to human 
rights internally is also refl ected in its wording concerning external ac-
tion. Human rights protection is for the fi rst time mentioned as an explic-
it aim of the EC’s external action, and therefore for common commercial 
policy. This can be interpreted as having signifi cant implications. As has 
been suggested, “while some of [the ‘new’ trade policy objectives, such 
as human rights] are currently contained … in the Preamble of the EC 
treaty ... Article III-315(1) [second sentence] in conjunction with Article 
III-292(1) explicitly requires the common commercial policy to contribute 
to these objectives rather than simply focus on the reduction of barriers 
to trade”. 158
The question now arises whether the insights from a human rights 
viewpoint articulated for the internal EC situation with regard to the bal-
ance between economic liberalisation and protecting access to education 
for all can also be applied externally. In particular, in line with the hu-
man rights precautionary principle as suggested in the previous section, 
could human rights arguments based on the Charter or Article III-292 
CT provide for useful a priori analysis to help states assess the condi-
tions under which commitments can be sought in the fi eld of education? 
Given the ambiguity of the terms of Article 14 Charter, however, it seems 
unlikely that it will be of great help in providing a coherent answer to this 
query.  
In the light of the analysis in the previous and current section, cau-
tion is called for in moving toward the greater subjection of education 
provision to the logic and law of economic liberalisation. In the face of 
uncertainty about the effects of the economic liberalisation of education, 
157 Ibid 45.
158 Krajewski (n 150) 107-108. Emphases added.
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careful national and EC trade policy-makers should not naturally rule 
out the possibility of (temporary) pre-emptive non-action as a legally and 
politically compelling legislative or negotiation option. Therefore, it seems 
essential for EC countries for the time being to hold their cards against 
their chest, not only in terms of offering commitments, but also in terms 
of seeking commitments - even if current conditions in world trade nego-
tiations may suggest a reverse dynamic159 - to avoid implications that are 
hard to reverse for EU citizens and non-EU citizens alike.
5. Conclusion
This paper has studied the interplay of economic liberalisation and 
the provision of education both in the WTO and the EC context. On pro-
viding an analytical background to this discussion, it has become clear 
that steering a course between uncompromising trade liberalisation and 
unequivocal rejection of anything relating to economic liberalisation leads 
to largely undiscovered waters. To help give some guidance, the human 
rights law compass can be applied, as it offers a critical perspective to 
measure both claims based on trade, as well as those based on non-trade 
policies. 
From the perspective of education policy-makers, integrating as-
pects of human rights law into a challenge to the WTO liberalisation of 
education services would likely both condition and bolster the case for 
pushing back market forces for the sake of a greater good. It could help 
articulate more precisely concerns about “giving education to the mar-
ket”, and make them more balanced to take account of the educational 
entitlement of all individuals on WTO Member States’ territories. Such 
a more convincing combination of the right to education and education 
policy concerns would make it easier for developing states in particular to 
resist commitments in the fi eld of education services. If it came to that, it 
would also make the challenge more legally precise, possibly enabling the 
WTO Dispute Settlement System to take on board educational concerns 
on their more precisely articulated terms if and when a WTO Member 
State were to present its defence in such terms.
In the EC setting, contradictory tendencies in current and possible 
future legal provisions with a bearing on the economic liberalisation of 
education provision make it very hard to draw a clear and unequivo-
cal picture of the legal state and nature of the debate. The analysis has 
shown that tendencies seem to go in the direction of insulating the provi-
sion of education from economic law in the internal setting, while setting 
159 Scherrer (n 47) 500 (warning against the fact that “Liberalisation in trade in services can 
now be wrung from developing countries with concessions on textile or agriculture imports 
for example”.)
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the stage for adopting a more economic approach to the same issue in 
the common commercial policy. Also, the perspective of human rights law 
in the form of an analysis based on the Charter does leave an ambigu-
ous picture. On the one hand, it hesitatingly acknowledges the obligation 
for primary and secondary education to be provided free of charge, but 
falling short of international norms. On the other hand, its explanations 
can be read as indirectly questioning the ECJ’s case law on the exclusion 
of public education provision from the scrutiny of economic law. It will 
doubtless be the ECJ that will eventually need to give each of these ele-
ments a place if the CT eventually comes into force.  
Finally, and more generally, it is possible to believe strongly in trade 
liberalisation, to subscribe to the importance of the provision of educa-
tion, and to defend the imperative of human rights protection - all at the 
same time. Yet, as it has emerged in this paper, when trade and non-
trade law clash, and human rights protection is added, diffi cult issues 
arise that are in fact largely still to be mapped. This paper has intended 
to illustrate what type of complex questions a Janus-faced trade/human 
rights lawyer confronts without giving in to the seduction of convenient 
selective blindness in two of his four eyes. In approach and substance, 
an attempt has been made to show that taking both trade/non-trade and 
human rights law seriously may lead legal analysts more conscientiously 
to start walking “sideways”, keeping two eyes fi rmly on developments on 
the human rights landscape in front, and two eyes on the trade/non-
trade landscapes in the back. “Blind” fundamentalism, or continued non-
engaging advocacy on either side, is not likely to let us see a great deal of 
progress. That would be a great shame. For, after all, the god Janus also 
represents the transition from primitive life to civilisation160 (and, to my 
knowledge, he only possesses one brain). 
160 Janus, Encyclopedia Mythica <http://www.pantheon.org/articles/j/janus.html>. 
